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Abstrak
Pelaksanaanprogramtransmigrasi di Indonesiaterkesan sangat ambisius dengan
berorientasikepadamasalahdemografl. Tiap Pelitaditargetkanpengirimansejumlah
transmigran ke luar Jawa dan Bali sering tidak realistik dan menimbulkan
permasalahan yang besar. Untuk mengatasi masalah ini disarankan hal-hal sebagai
berikut.Jumlah transmigran yang dikirim tidak didasarkankepada target kesesuaian
daya tampung di daerah tujuan. Pemindahan penduduk diprioritaskan bagi daerah
kritis, bencana alam, atau wilayah yang terkena proyek pembangunan. Penduduk
lokaldengan keragamansosial budayaperludiikutkandalamprogram ini.Usahakan
peningkatanpengiriman transmigran spontan.
The Indonesian government's
persistent efforts to resettle large
numbersofso-calledtransmigrants from
the densely populated islands of inner
Indonesia to the less crowded Outer
Islands, already have raised much
concern and discussion among both
domestic and foreign experts. Especially
so, since the government decided to
step up transmigration to an ambitious
750,000families duringthe last FiveYear
Development Plan period (1984/1989),
at the same time introducingnew types
of transmigration projects and
opening-up new settlement areas in
"sensitive" provinces like IrianJaya and
East Timor. In the meantime increased
doubts on the effectiveness andviability
of the programme pressed the World
Bank to consider its 160 million
US-dollar loanto the pogrammein1986.
The official reasons offered were the
disappointing returns to investments
and budgetary problems of the central
government, but
-
allegedly
-
ecological
problems and political problems of
social integration (the "Javanization"
issue) played a decisive role as well.
Despite the subsequent curtailingof the
programme there are few signs that the
government really has given up its
ambitiouspolicyfor thenear future. The
present reduction of the total target
figure to 175,000 families during
RepelitaV (1989/1994) rather seems to
represent a temporary adjustment to
financial constraints thanafundamental
change in outlook. It still is relevant
therefore, to pay criticalattention to the
basic assumptions and effects of this
much disputed programme.
Inthis paper we hope to contribute
some alternatives from a more holistic
point of view and from experiences in
other countries as well. Meanwhile, we
are well aware of the fact that
transmigration already has become an
integralpart of Indonesiansociety since
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many decades and as such cannot and
should not simply be discarded as a
mirage. On the other hand however,
there aremanysigns that transmigration
has become a national myth or even a
sacred cow. And as both experts and
policy makers know, myths and sacred
cows maybecomevery costly interms of
human suffering and economic costs.
For this reason a continuing and
open discussion on the limitations and
possibilities of transmigration seems to
be as before.
Consequently this paper is focusing
on three main questions:
1. "What are the effects of the present
transmigration policy on the quality
and the effectiveness of the
programme in the Outer Islands?
2. To what extent is transmigration still
amatter oflifeor deathfor solvingthe
problems of the density populated
islands, i.e.Java?
3- Which conclusions may be drawn
from the analysis of the previous
questions,as far as alternativepolicies
are concerned?
A. Aims and Effects of the Present
Transmigration Programme
The present transmigration
programme is (still) primartily based on
thegovernment-sponsoredresettlement
of transmigrants from Inner Indonesia
(Java, Madura, Bali, Lombok) in
agricultural settlement areas in the
Outer Islands. These sponsored
transmigrants (transmigran umum)
preferably are selected from young,
maled-headed, and landless farmer
households. On arrival they are
allocateda2or 3ha.farmlot (depending
on the quality of the land), as well as a
pre-constructed house with a garden.
Usually most of the farm area has to be
clearedbythetransmigrants themselves.
In addition the transmigrants are
suppliuedwith food, tools andfertilizer
duringthe first year inthe settlement
Beside this flow of government-
sponsored migrants there is also a
steadily increasing flow of spontaneous
migrants (transmigranswakarsa), who
usually join their relatives in the
established settlements, before starting
a living of their own. This secondary of
transmigrants amounts to about one
thirdof the total flow. Itis especially the
increase ofthis spontaneous flowwhich
the government seeks to trigger off,
because it is so much cheaper and adds
to the effectiveness of the programme.
The major aims of the present
transmigration policy are:
-
achieving a more favourable
distribution of the national
population and the labour force,
-
developing new resources and
productive areas inthe Outer Islands
(mainly through agricultural
resettlement),
-
increasinglivingstandards inboththe
areas of origin and destination of the
transmigrants, and
-
integrating the national territory and
fostering national unity by bringing
together the various ethnic groups
and cultures.
Although these aims havebeenquite
persistent over time (repelitaI-IV),their
stress and mixture sometimes have
changed considerably. This is especially
true for the so-called demographic aim
(which is not mentioned explicitly) i.e.,
alleviating population growth and
pressure inJava. The logic of this aim is
based on the argumentation that Java
andBalihave63 percent of the national
population on just 8 percent of its
territory, so that widespread
landlessness, rural poverty and
environmental deterioration can be
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solve only by extensive population
redistribution measures (cf. Widjojo
Nitisastro 1963; Wander, 1965; Amdt
1977, 1983) as an impossible solution,
the demographic aim repeatedly crops
up again whenever authorities become
nervous about Java's continuing
populationgrowth andthe problems to
curb it through family planning. It
usually does so however, in a hidden
form like the necessity of evening the
distribution of population and the
supply of labour for national
development purposes. The persistence
of this argument is clearly reflected in
the very high target-figures set for the
programme during the last Five Year
Development Plan (Repelita IV)
envisaging the resettlement of 2.5
million people, as well as another 10 to
14 million people for the next two
decades, making the programme the
world's biggest resettlement effort in
history.
Such targets usually are based on
arbitrary estimations of the carrying
capacity of Java, as if it will remain a
predominantly agricultural islandwith a
more or less fixed resource system (see
Table 1).
The limited value of this land of
economic-demographic arithmatic is
demonstrated by the fact that the total
amount of landsuitable for agricultural
use in the Outer Islands at present is
estimated at roughly 24 millionha. On2
ha. farms this implies an absorption
capacity of 12 million farmers or some
50 million people. By transferring the
whole natural increase ofJava and Bali
of 2 million people per year
-
a
tremendous effort in terms of
investments and logistics
-
the last
reserves would have been exhausted
within a generation and the outcome
wouldstillbeapopulationof100million
inJava and a mass of small peasants on
marginal lands in the Outer Islands,
whereas most of the capital necessary
for other development purposes would
havebeenabsorbedbythis programme.
Even the argument that the
underpopulated parts of the Outer
Islandsneedalarger supply oflabour in
order to be developed, may be looked
uponwithsome scepticism. Considering
TABLE 1
POPULATIONPROJECTIONSFORINDONESIA
Population inmillions
Census
1980
Projection
1990
Projection
2000
Projection
2010
Indonesia (r=2.3296) 147 185 233 293
Java (r=2.0296) 91 111 136 166
Percentage inJava 61.8 60.1 58.3 56.6
Maximum population
inJava 70 70 70 70
Excess population
inJava 21 41 66 96
Source: A.H. Mutalib, 1985, Table 14.1
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that the Outer Islands all have much
higher rates of natural increase (2.5-3
percent) than Java (1.9 percent, and
similar underemployment figures,
whereas their development requires
first of all a supply of skilled and semi¬
skilled workers, transmigration of
impoverished farmers hardly seems to
offer a positive contribution (cf, Jones
1979,Hugo et al. 1987).
Finally, some doubts may be cast on
the necessity of a more equal
distribution of the population for
national development purposes, as this
presumesavast reserve ofunderutilized
resources which can be found for the
asssumption (that in fact has become a
myth in itself). Moreover, in highly
developed parts of the world huge
differences in population density
between different areas may coexist
without hampering national
development or security (e.g. the
Megalopolis on the East Coast of the
United States versus the deserts in the
West, or the densely populated central
parts of Western Europe versus the
empty Far North). Even within smaller
countries like Sweden or France there
are extreme differences in density for
quite large areas.
On the other hand, it cannot be
denied that in terms of numbers of
transmigrants and logistics the
programme has become increasingly
effective since Repelita I(1969/1974).
Consequently, both the number of
government-sponsored and
spontaneous migrants (the latter in a
ratio of 1:2) have been increasing over
time.
As a result Java has been
experiencing a net outmigration for
nearly two decades and some three
million of its inhabitants have been
moved out, who otherwise would have
burdened the local economy and
environment Much of this achievemnt
however, has been realized at high and
ever increasing economic, social and
environmentalcosts. Itisourcontention
that manyof thesecostsmighthavebeen
averted if the government would have
taken a more realistic stand towards
some of the programme's basic
assumptions and expectations. The
main theme in our paper is that within
the framework of the present
transmigration policy various aims are
mutually contradictory and that it is
especially the hidden aim of alleviating
demographic pressuresonJavatogether
TABLE2
TARGETS AND REALIZEDNUMBERSOFTRANSMIGRANT FAMILIES
ININDONESIA'SFIVE-YEARDEVELOPMENTPLANS (REPELITA I-IV)
Plan-period Target Achievement Percentage
RepelitaI(1969-1974) 41,000 45,169 110
Repelita II(1974-1979) 250,000 87,800 35
Repelita III(1979-1984) 500,000 535,474 107
Repelita IV (1984-1989) 465,000* 477,000* 103*
Source: Van der Wijst, 1985, tab. 2
Hugo et al., 1987, tab. 6.6
World Banmk, 1988, tab. 1.4
* Note: Therepelita IVfigures only apply to the periodApril 1984 -June 1987.
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with the political aim of national by the settlement of remote, empty, and
integration, that are causingthe greatest infertile areas for strategic reasons, like
troubles. The continuous drive for the borderland areas of IrianJaya and
realizing high targets in terms of West Kalimantan.
numbers of transmigrants is negatively Technically, of course, marginal
affectingtheprogrammeinthe following lands may be convertedintoproductive
ways: land,butfrequentlyonlyathighcostsfor
1. The Occupation of Marginal Lands drainage, irrigation,_ soil improvement,
* tArHlfrnrc onH nlnrifinnwith iwannwlc
As the best lands already have been
occupied by the autochtonous
populations,usuallyonlymarginallands
like tidal swamps, alang-alanguplands,
and lateritic and podzolic spoils are left
for the transmigrants. This tendency for
ecological margionalization of the
transmigrants seems to apply in
particular to the new waves sent since
the start ofRepelita IV.The mainreason
for this being that the more eccessible
and better endowed transmigration
areas in Sumatra have already become
more or less saturated, so that the focus
of transmigration is shifting to less
favourable areas in Kalimantan,
Sulawesi, and IrianJaya (see Table 3).A
problemwhich is sometimes aggravated
TABLE3
NUMBER OFTRANSMIGRATED PERSONS BY ISLANDOFDESTINATION
Period Sumatra Kalimantan Sulawesi Other Total
Repelita I 121,111 29,013 57,868 2,192 210,184
% 57.6 13.8 27.5 1.0 100.0
Repelita II 199,151 64,138 73,757 3,758 340,804
% 58.4 18.8 21.6 1.1 100.0
Repelita III 1,149,710 388,515 211,935 110,770 1,860,930
% 61.8 20.9 11.4 6.0 100.0
Repelita IV 812,855 343,523 126,910 78,910 1,362,200
% 59.7 25.2 9.3 5.8 100.0
Total 2,282,827 825,189 470,470 195,630 3,774,116
Source: Hugoet al., 1987, tab. 6.8; figures for Repelita IVare basedondatauo to
May, 1986.
ICIUilZClS, (U1U £Sl«UlUIlg£ W1U1 pciciuuiua
(Collier, 1980). Thus, tidal swamp areas
may be converted into wet-rice fields
only if the peat layer is not exceeding a
depth of 1to 1.5 meters and only at the
cost of applyingmany tons of limestone
and fertilizers for neutralizing its high
acidity that is detrimental to
rice-growing.Similarly the podzolic soils
of the tropical rainforest require
croprotation and fertilizing to
compensate for their low natural
fertility.
Transport problems, limited
marketingopportunities, small farm size
and lack of skill are often inhibitive to
these technical improvements. The
result isaquick degradationof farmland
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aggravated by improper farming
techniques, as well as much ecological
damage through deforestation
prolification of alang-alang (imperata
cylindrica), soil depletion, erosion,
salination, dessication, etc.
A welknown consequence of the
occupation of marginal land combined
with the urge for self-sufficiency, is the
reversion of subsistence farmers to
cassava cultivation; a less demanding
crop interms of soil-fertility and inputs,
but progressively depleting the land so
that the farmer soon is caught in a self-
defeating process. These processes are
enhanced by the target-huntingpolicies
of both the national and regional
governments, causing the settlement of
too many small fanners on marginal,
badly surveyed and ill-prepared lands.
Notoriousexamples are found inSitiung
(West Sumatra), where mechanical
clearingof the rainforest causedmassive
destruction of the top-soil, forsing the
farmers into cassava cultivation, as well
as the failure in Air Sugihan (South
Sumatra) where some 80,000
transmigrants were trapped into a badly
surveyed tidal swamp area with thick
opeat layers and lacking potable water
(Secrett 1986). According to a
conservative estimation some 300,000
transmigrant families are presentlyliving
on sites that are ecologically incapable
of sustaining them in even the most
marginal conditions (cf. Rich 1986).
2. IncreasingCosts per
Transmigrant and Diminishing
Returns
Arndt (1983) has calculated an
increaseincostperhouseholdfrom 577
US dollars in 1969/1970 to 11,663 US
dollars in 1982/1983 (which implies a
direct cost for the Repelita IVbudget of
2 billionUS dollars ayear). These rising
budgets can be procured only with
heavyWorld Bankloans, that have tobe
repayed in due time. The increasing
burden of the programme seems to be
closely relatedto the increasingcosts of
occupying marginal land, using
expensive foreign consultancy firms and
improving the facilities of the projects
(to make transmigration more
attractive). These rising costs of the
programme could have been justified if
they had been balanced by increasing
returns to investments. This was exactly
the purpose of the so-called Nucleus
Estate (NES) or PIR-system, which
connected with transmigration might
both absorb small farmers and increase
export productionofperennialcropson
poor soils.
Although investments in this type of
estate-settlement are very high (Rp 20
million per farmer-household) the
World Bank became very interested
becauseofthehighexpectedreturns (cf.
AminAziz &NugrohoSemedi 1985).The
recent fall in world-market proces,
however, has completely jeopardized
this programme and is especially hitting
the "plasma" farmers of the nucleus
estates. The probably structural
character of the price-fall on the
commoditymarkets for palmoil, rubber,
and copra make prospects for
PIR-transmigration projects rather
gloomy. The only solution would be to
increase economies of scale for the
PIR-projectsby excludingsmall farmers.
Actually this process has already started
with offering a larger share to the
NucleusEstate companies by incraesing
their share to 40 percent of the total
area. This policy however, is clearly
contradicting the (hidden)
demographic aim of the transmigration
programme. Consequently, the number
of transmigrants resettled according to
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this Nucleus Estate or PIR-system, has
beenfalling far behindexpectations (cf.
Hardjono, 1986;World Bank, 1989).
3. Dual Sector Development
Grafting small fanners (originally
peasants from Java) on a large scale
Nucleus Estate System, may easily cause
the perpetuation of a dualistic
production structure similar to that
existing during the colonial period in
Java. The role of small farmers in the
PIR-system in fact is reduced to
suppliers of cheap labour, land, and
produce, as they have no real say inthe
estate's management, whereas they are
completely dependent on its services.
Recent evidence for this is boundinthe
way the estate firms have brudened the
"plasma" farmers with heavy installment
costs for the conversion of their land,
whereas they are themselves unwilling
to carry the risk of falling commodity
prices. The dependency of the plasma
farmers is increasedby the fact that they
donothavesufficient landofreasonable
quality for cultivating their own food
crops during periods of crisis (like the
small rubber producers inSumatra).
Ofcourse thisdoesnotmeanthat the
PIR-system has no potential for utilizing
marginal land, increasing export
production and even absorbing some
labour (cf. Mubyarto, 1985). It should
however no longer beconnectingto the
aim of settling as many small-farmers as
possible (ontoo small farms) inorder to
comply with the transmigration aims. In
other words the "PIR-Trans" policy
should be replaced by a "PIR-Bun"
(plantation-NES) policy with better
conditions for the tillers,who preferably
shouldbe trainedsettlers (TSI-farmers).
Interesting lessons on failing small
farmer settlement schemes and the role
of estate firms may be learnedalso from
the experiences in Amazona, Brazil.
Here, finally the estates have taken over
thye land from the small settlers or just
prevented them access to the better
locations (cf. Kleinpenning, 1978).
4. "Hollow-Frontier" Settlement
This concept developed by Preston
James to explain failing "colonization"
schemes in Latin America, seems to fit
also many Indonesian transmigration
schemes. The concept implies that the
occupation of wastelands can only
succeed if it is sufficiently backed up by
a densifyingpopulationandaprocessof
economic diversification in its
hinterland, which supply capital goods,
marketing opportunities and other
services to the agricultural frontier areas
through a continuously expanding
network of roads and service centers.
Frequently however, these backing-up
facilities are lackingcompletely as many
Latin American schemes have been set
up too far away from the inhabited
world, because the authorities were
eager to occupy empty areas ("gobemar
es poblar"), or because the colonists
were hunting for mineral treasures and
richlands for the speculative cultivation
of coffee. In these cases the often
marginal landwas quicklyexploitedand
depleted, after which the colonists
either went on to the next frontier, or
remained on the spot as impoverished
farmers (caboclos).
Inneither case the diversification of
the hinterland could materialize and
sooner or later the "hollow" frontier
might even collapse.
There are clear signs that similar
processes are occurring in the
transmigration areas in Indonesia,
where farmers are settled far away from
roads and market centers, where there
are no opportunities for additional
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incomes through off-farm employment,
no public facilities (health and
education) andwhere the transmigrants
are fallingback onprimitive techniques
of self-sufficient food-crop cultivation
(cassava), or simply leave the site for a
job in the nearest city (Palembang,
Balikpapan or Merauke). The vital
importance of nearby opportunities for
supplementing the meager farm income
is clearly reflected in Table 4, showing
the various sources of income for
transmigrants settled during Repelita II
and III.
No less than 67.5 percent of the
transmigrant households have an
income derived from non-farm sources.
The main cause for "hollow- frontier"
development therefore, is not the
lethargy or the speculative attituide of
the transmigrants, but the target-
huntingpolicy of the authorities leaving
no time and no room for a gradual
process of occupying wasteland by
moving outward from a few more
densely populated areas which are
supporting the process with services
and (non-agricultural )income
opportunities.
5. Management Problems
Most management problems in
transmigration schemes are ensuing
from hastily devised plans in order to
fulfil the target figures. This becomes
evident already from the first stages of
the land evaluation and feasibility
studies. Hie surveys are often carried
out ina rather hap-hazardous way and
in a very short time (±.2 months) with
insufficient field checks on hyudrology
and soil quality. The costly phase of the
feasibility study, usually carried out by
foreign consultants, discloses that on
the average only 20-25 'percent of the
originally surveyed areas are fit for
human settlement. However, the
authorities frequently try to raise this
percentage (against the advise of the
consultant) in order to place the
targeted number of transmigrants. A
recent study by the Land Resources
Developmeht Center (U.K.) for example
concluded that, although only about
75,000 ha. in Central Kalimantan were
suitable andavailable for transmigration
sites, government targets project the
clearance of nearly seventeen times as
muchforestbetween1979-1989(secrett
tabu;4
MONTHLY HOUSEHOLDINCOMESBY TYPEOFTRANSMIGRANT AND
SOURCEOFINCOME(rp/MONTH). 19S4/19S5
Type ofmigrant Sample Farm Non-farm Total % non-
size income income income farm
Sponsored 1800 18,876 35,565 54,441 653
Spontaneous 152 23,533 43,208 66,741 64,7
Retiredmilitary 57 16,325 101,381 117,706 86.1
Localorigin 186 20,581 53,464 74,045 72.2
Source: World Bank, 1988, tab. 2-4, basedonBPSTransmigration IncomeSurvey,
1985.
66
Populasi, 1(3),1992
1986). These feasibility problems and
those of the next phase (site-
preparation) are also related to the
so-called PAYP (Plan As ou Priceed)
system.Thisplanningsystem - devisedto
catchupwith the over-ambitious targets
-
actually is invitinghaphazard (ad hie)
solutions as it leaves no time and room
for matured plans. Morover, once
started ina wrong location or direction
it is very difficult to make corrections.
6. IntegrationProblemswith the
Original/Local Population
The aim of increasing national unity
by integratingthe local inhabitants with
transmigrants from Java/Bali frequently
is disturbed by forced attempts to bring
them together in the samescheme
(APPDT programme). The idea behind
the APPDT programme is that the local
population should also enjoy the
advantages of the transmigration
programmefacilities, inorder to prevent
feelings of jealousy. Forthis purpose 25
percent of the participants are local
transmigrants translok. In reality
however, there are manybarriers to this
planned integration. The sheer volume
of the number of transmigrants already
may cause social unrest amongthe local
population, as it fears to become a
culturalminority initsownhomeland.A
much disputed case has been the
scheduled settlement of some 690,000
transmigrants from Java in Irian Jaya
during die last Five Year Development
Plan(1984-1989),thus inflatingthe local
population with 54 percent! This
quantitative integrationproblemmay be
increased by large cultural and
economic differences, which make it
impossible to blend the two groups in
one settlement project or production
system. Thevery different typesof social
organization and modes of production
of the communally organized
MelanesianandDayaktribesinIrianand
Kalimantan, compared with that of the
individuallyoperatingandcommercially
orientedJavanese peasant offer a dear
exampleforthis.Frequentlyconflictsare
arising from different systems of land
tenure/property relations, aggravated
by the lack of suitable land for
transmigration sites (cf. Loekman
Soetrisno, 1985; Mubyarto, 1985). The
present transmigration policy,
therefore, seems to be an athema to a
carefully planned integration policy.
From this brief analysis of the main
problems of the transmigration
programmewe maydrawthe conclusion
that practically all traffic lights for the
government's resetdement policy have
switchedto red, indicatingthe necessity
of a thorough rethinkingof its aims and
underlyingassumptions.
B. The Role of Transmigration for
Java
Past and present (Repelita IV)
transmigration programmes were still
guidedbythe "hidden" aimofalleviating
rural population pressure inJava, next
to the aim of increasing the living
standards of both the farmers in the
areas of origin and those transmigrated
to the Outer Islands. These aims are
based on the assumption that Java still
has a mainly agricultural society which
suffers from heavy over-population,
rural poverty and environmental
degradation, and is going to have these
problems for a longtime to come (even
taing into account the most optimistic
population projections with quickly
declining marital fertility rates). For the
policy makers transmigration seems the
only way out, considering the reality of
an absolutely increasingcultural labour
force in a situation of extensive
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landlessness, underemployment and
overexploitation of marginal lands. The
economic-demographic solution of
transmigration thus seems the logic
answer to the economic-demographic
problems of an overpopulated
agricultural island.At least as longas the
Outer Islands offer sufficient viable
opportunities for new agricultural
settlements (on which already some
doubt has been cast).
Itmight be expected that under the
conditions mentioned before, the rural
poor would respond massively to the
opportunities offered to them by the
successive transmigration programmes
andthus might increase their own living
standards as well as of those staying
behind (by easing the pressure on
resources).
In the following analysis however;
we shall see that this is rarely the case,
and that the basic assumptions (relatig
to the economic-demographic situation
inJava) are no longer aplicable in their
simple form.
Our analysis is based on both
macro-level data and some scarce
micro-level studies on the perception,
response and consequences of
transmigration at the village level (cf.
Singarimbun, 1980; Nijkamp & Peeters,
1984). Fromthese studies the following
picture emerges.
1. Response tothe Transmigration
Programme
Very few sources disclose an
enthousiastic response of even the
poorest strata to the programme. More
often we hear about pressures exerted
upon potential transmigrants by
government officials, village heads, etc.
Research of the Geographical Institute
(Utrecht) cooperating with the
Transmigration Monitoring and
Evaluation Institute (Bogor), on the
transmigration response intwo villages
in Wonosobo residency in 1983
confirmed this picture.
The villages situated in the same
subdistrict (Kaliwiro) were comparable
in strength of programme efforts, their
socioeconomic stratification and
location, but not in their economic
potential. One (Ngadisono), being
mainly an upland village with dry land
(tegalan) farming and mixed-forest
gardening; the other (Kauman), being a
tegalan and rain-fed rice producing
{sawab tadab bujan) village.
Ngadisono had njore evenly spread
employment opportunities throughout
the year (mainly through perennial
crops and palm-sugar processing), a
stronger bargaining position and
consequently better access to non-
agricultural employment opportunities
outside the village than Kauman, which
suffered from heavy seasonal
unemployment and had less access to
external sources of income.
Consequently, the response to
transmigration was much stronger in
KaumanthaninNgadisono,where there
was more migration to the cities and
seasonal circulation to nearby ruraland
urban employment opportunities, or
evento PIR-projectsunder construction
inSumatra.
Even in Kauman, however, only the
poorest strata which had no other
choice, enlisted for transmigration. An
employment preference-scale
investigation disclosed that ion both
villages transmigration was seen only as
a last resort.
Considering the hardships of
transmigration and the low overall
response to programme effort, it is not
surprising that most transmigrants are
recruited from so-called "minus" areas
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TABLE5
GOVERNMENT SPONSOREDTRANSMIGRANT FAMILIESMOVEDDURING
THEFIRSTYEARS OFREPELITAIVBY REGIONOFORIGINAND PRIORITYCATEGORY
Number of families
Region of Priority category Total
origin 1984/85 1985/86 Total 1984-'86
DidJakarta 582 585 1,167 Natural disaster areas 10,680
West Java 7,469 10,228 17,697 Critical eroded areas 38,436
CentralJava 11,160 13,937 25,097 Densely populated areas 13,763
DIYogyakarta 2,216 2,309 4,525 Development Project areas 9300
EastJava 12,022 10,291 22,313 Armed Forces program 594
Bali + West
Nusa Tenggara 1,420 1,451 2,871 Social welfare program 1,160
Local settlers 3,620 8,751 12,372 Oocal settler projects 12,371
Resettlement 8,477 9,518 17,995 Resettlement projects 17,732
Relocation 4,592 815 5,407 Relocation measures 5,407
Total 51,558 57,885 109,443 Total 109,443
Source: J. Hardjono, 1986, tables 4 and 5
and from the lowest status groups (cf.
Hardjono, 1986).
2. Effects onLocal Population
Pressure
Whereas the illusory effect
transmigration onalleviatingpopulation
pressure for Java as a whole has been
sufficiently proved, it has beenseldomly
so at the village level. The studies of
Singarimbun (1980) and Nijkamp &
Peeters (1984) however,showthat even
at the local level, transmigration rarely
improvestheresourcebaseofthevillage
community. The opportunities or land
left behind by the transmigrants are
usually filled in very soon after their
departure, both through natural
population increase and inmigration.
Frequently the land is bought by a few
richer farmers and village officials
(pamong desa), or even by people
outside the village, i.e. by persons who
needit least. Inmost cases however, the
landless transmigrants leavebehindvery
little,so that their departurehardlyadds
to the resourcebase of thevillage.At the
macro level of analysis however,
transmigration may have some
-
although temporary - beneficial effects
on the rural labour force. Manning
(1988) has attributed the slowingdown
of the rural labour force growth rates in
Javafrom 1.9percentin1971-1980to 1.5
percent in 1980-1985, to the impact of
the expanded transmigration
programme during Third Five Year
Development Plan. The decreasing
growth of this rural labour force came
very timely because of the economic
stagnation followingthe fall ofoilprices
duringthe early 1980s. Inviewofcuts in
the public budget and increasing
difficulties in finding suitable
transmigration sites, it seems unlikely
however, that a similar number can be
moved during the present Five Year
Plan.
3. Effects on Living Standards
The departure of the poorestpeople
from the villages does not only change
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very little in their agricultural
resource-base, but usually the various
activities of the enlisted transmigrants
are of such a marginal character, that
their departure doesnotaddvery much
to the localincomeopportunitieseither.
Actually, it hasalready been shown in
many migration studies that
outmigration rarely offers a solution for
the structural causes of communal
poverty, which frequently are more a
question of skewed power relations,
terms of trade, land tenure, etc. On the
other hand the transmigrants may
experienceaconsiderable improvement
in their livingstandards if the project is
properly selected and well organized.
Especially if previously they were
landless farmers. The problems
experienced in most transmigration
projects however, are the main reason
for the disappointing improvements in
standards of living. As Arndt (1983)
noticed:
"Even in the new World Bank
assisted settlements, farmers
withanaverage ofjust over 1ha
under cultivation are found
after 3-4 years on the site to
reach an annual family income
of only about $ 600 (1962
prices), whereas the standard
set by the programme itself isI
1000. This income figure may
alsobe compared with an
estimated average per capita
consumption expenditure of
about |120 in rural Java. It is
clear therefore, that taking
account of the hardships and
risks of failure in the
transmigration schemes, as well
as the more ample off-farm and
non-farm employment
opportunities in Java, few
farmers are really attracted by
the transmigration schemes as
longas they haveanyalternative
inJava itself (which inaddition
has much better facilities for
education, health, and
transport)."
A fewyears later this conclusionwas
confirmedby the findings of the Central
TABLEtf
COMPARISONOFTRANSMIGRANT AND NON-TRANSMIGRANTINCOMES (RP/MONTH)
% with monthly
Type of settlement Survey Monthly income belowRp Annual
area date househ. household
income 30,000 50,000 income
(USI)
Transmigration sites 1985 58,300 20 50 636
Rural sending areas 1984 67,200 15 43 733 '
Rural receivingareas 1984 90,750 4 24 990
Note: Rp 30,000 is the monthlysubsistence level for a family of five.
Rp 50,000 is the family poverty line, estimated at Rp 10,000 per
capita/month.
Source: World Bank, 1988, table 4.
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Bureau of Statistics Transmigration
IncomeSurvey.
4. Employment and Transmigration
Several studies have revealed that in
Indonesia, and especially in Java, off-
and non-farm opportunities have
expanded considerably during the last
intercensal decade (cf. Jones 1984;
Manning1987,1988).The changeswere
closely relatedtoboththe oil-boomand
agricultural sector development,
bringing increasing activities in urban
enters as well as inruralareas through a
process of economic growth and
diversification.
Intercensal rates of labour-
absorption show that especially the
services (5) and manufacturing (A)
sector has been laggingbehind.
Consequently, the share of the
A-sector in total employment has fallen
from 67.0 percent in 1971 to 55.5
percent in 1980, whereas the share of
the M-sector rose from 8.9 percent to
12.7 percent and that of the S-sector
from 24 percent to 31-8 percent The
declining share of the A-sector, clearly
reflects the initial stage of
de-agrarianization of Java's economy.
Lookingmore intodetailwe canseethat
even in the rural areas most new
employment opportunities have been
created in the S-sector (especially in
private and public services, trade and
transport) as well as inthe construction
branchof theM-sector (cf. DiahWidarti,
1984;Jones, 1984). This means that the
rural population has been able to
diversify its means of living, as well as to
obtain a larger share of the urbanbased
activities through labour-mobility and
remittances frompermanentmigrants in
the cities (cf. Hugo, 1978;Mantra, 1979;
Manning, 1987).
On the other hand, more recent
evidence suggests that since the early
1980sagricultural employment creation
seems to have been on the increase
TABLE 7
GROWTH OFGROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GY),EMPLOYMENT (GN) AND CORRESPONDING
COEFFICIENTSOFLABOURABSORPTION (G) PERECONOMIC SECTOR ININDONESIA
(1971-1980) AND CENTRALJAVA (1975- 1980)
Economic sector Average
Indicator by rate
region Primary (A) Secondary (M) Tertiary (S) peryear*
Indonesia: Gy 3-64 10.92 9.22 7.52
Gn 1.43 7.10 6.92 2.89
Y 0.39 0.65 0.75 0.38
C.Java: Gy 513 1105 8.61 7.25
Gn 1.38 2.90 3 59 2.22
Y 0.27 0.26 0.42 0.31
Source: A Komalig, et al., 1984,p. 83, 169
* N.B. The growth rates of Gn and Gy do not represent exponential rates, but
ten-year averages of the total increase.
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TABLES
GROWTHOFLABOURFORCEAND EMPLOYMENTPER SECTOR, 1971-1985
Population
by region
Annual growth rates
Agricultural
employment
Non-agricultural
employment
Total
employment
Labour
force
Bothsexes
(1971-1980)
Indonesia 1.23 5.87 3-04 2.98
Java 0.61 4.87 2.76 2.69
RuralJava 0.63 4.98 1.92 1.89
Males
1980-1985)
Indonesia 2.25 365 2.87 303
Java 1.45 364 2.52 2.71
RuralJava 0.27 1.70 1.44 1.48
Source: Manning, 1988; based on Population Census 1971 (Series C) and 1980
(Series S2), and the Intercensal Population Survey (SUPAS) in 1985.
again, whereas non-farm employment
growthhadslackened (seeTable8). The
major cause for this beingprobably the
recent economic depression following
the fall of export-commodity prices and
public budget cuttings. According to
Manning(1988) however,the successful
intensification of agriculture (especially
rice cultivation) must also have
contributed to the increase of much of
the absorption capacity of the farm
sector through practices like multiple
cropping and the maintenance of low
levels of mechanization.
Undoubtedly this absorptive
capacity should be attributed also to
increased pressures of family labour on
sharing the available opportunities
within the farm-sector during slack
periods. In the long run however, this
must be a self-defeating process, since
the progress of agricultural
commercialization and innovation will
certainly oppose the absorptive role of
the agricultural sector, as has happened
already in the recent past (cf. Collier,
1982; Jones, 1984). Considering the
economic recovery during the second
half of the 1980s, the resumption of the
labour absorption pattern during the
1970s seems more probable.
Moreover, other studies (White,
1979; Rietveld, 1986) have disclosed
that an increasingshare of rural income
is derivedfrom non-agriculturalsources
(locally more than 50 percent of the
rural household income), and that
competition from urban- industrial
employment opportunities
(construction, manufacturing,
transport) has already caused local
shortages in the supply of agricultural
labour (Collier, 1982; Preston, 1989).
Although the majorityof these non-farm
and urban employment opportunities
are of a small-scale informal type, their
contributiontoboththe householdand
the national economy should not be
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underestimated. Even when wages/
incomesperhourarelow,thepossibility
to work many hoursper day all theyear
round, makes these activities a more
important source of income than the
contribution of these activities
-
often
qualified as marginal and superfluous •
should also not be underrated. They
have important functions, not only as
sources of income and employment for
themassofunskilledworkers (whothus
mayshareintheseepage of incomesand
produce generated by formal sector
activities), but also because of their
supportive functions in the process of
economic development. Namely, as
cheap suppliers of labour, services, and
goods to the formal sector, enablingthis
sector to pay low wages, and have low
overhead costs, which are necessary
conditions for accumulating and
re-investingcapital (underconditions of
heavy competition from producers
abroad and low world-market prices).
Thus, it becomes clear that informal
sector activities are going to play an
important part in both labour
absorption and economic development
in Indonesia as loong as the A and M
sectors are able to increase productivity
in order to support a large S-sector
(formal and informal). This is not to say
that the A and M sectors should only
develop into large-scale corporate
activities, as even inthese sectors there
is still scope for increasing the
productivity in small-scale enterprises
(cf. Japan, Taiwan, South Korea).
Consequently, extensive expulsion of
labour can be prevented under
conditions of continuing growth.
Another interesting option for Java
mightbethe transformationofindustrial
cash-crop and staple-crop agriculture
into more intensive food-crop farming
andhorticulture,servingthedemandsof
the increasing urban population. This
process has alreday started
spontaneously in some favourably
located areas trying to switch from the
cultivation of sugarcane to die multiple
cropping of HYV-rice, and from staples
like cassava, maize, or evenriceto fruits
(oranges), vegetables, and dairy or
poultry farming. From the preceding
analysis we may draw the conclusion
that Java has already embarked upon a
process of de-agrarianization and
increasing urbanization without a
large-scale dislocation of its population
(cf. Jones, 1984; Hugo et al., 1987). At
the same time this might take away one
of the most pressingfactors for stepping
up transmigration, thus offering the
government more time to reconsider
this programme and plan it more
carefully.
5. The Evidence from Some
PopulationProjections
The economic-demographic impact
of transmigration at the macro level can
be assessedwith the help of population
andemploymentprojectionsapplyingto
different parts of Indonesia affected by
the programme.A recent attempt by the
WorldBank (1988) shows the effectson
boththetotalpopulationandthe labour
force in Inner and Outer Indonesia of
various transmigration streams.
(Appendix I).
It may be inferred from these
projections that the most optimistic
scenarios will reduce the incremental
population of Inner Indonesia with
some 9-13 percent of that without the
programme, which means that the
environmental pressure inJava will be
affectedonlymarginally.Pressureonthe
labour market is considerably further
reduced i.e. by some 19-24 percent,
which isparticularlyinterestingbecause
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of itscumulative effect intheruralareas
of origin. A major problem with these
optimistic scenarios however, is their
small chance of becominga reality.The
mainconditionsbeingahighproportion
of spontaneous migrants and the
successful extension of the
transmigration programme into
marginal lands through the Nucleus
Estate System. The spontaneous
migrantsare increasinglyhamperedbya
lack of suitable land without property
claims,whereas theNES-settlementsare
hampered by high investment
requirementsanddiminishingreturnsto
capital. Under these conditions the
modest scenarios seem to be more
realistic, although the transfer of
200,000 families still requires
considerable efforts in terms of finding
suitable land and sufficient funds
because of increasing costs of
settlement At the same time moreover,
their demographic impact dwindles to
an insignificant 3-6 percent as fur as the
reduction of the total population is
concerned.
On the other hand it should be
recognized that transmigration has
made considerable contributions to the
creation of new employment
opportunities in Outer Indonesia.
According to estimations by the World
Bank (1988) some 500-660,000
permanent jobs have been created
duringRepel)ta III,i.e.about as manyas
the total number of households moved
from Inner Indonesia during the Five
Year Development Plan period. When
computing the cost per job created, the
World Bank (1988, p.80) even assumes
a ratio of two jobs per household
moved, which seems too optimistic in
the light of the achievements during
Repelita III.According to the Bank die
cost per householdmovedhadreadied
an average of US! 7000-9000 during
Repelita in, depending on the type of
settlement Thismeansthataccordingto
their estimates the cost per job are just
half of that The German Development
Agency (GTZ) however, already
assumed an average of US! 13,000 per
householdin1986 (GEO, 1986),so that
theaverage costofcreatingapermanent
job may actually amount to US!
7000-10000. This isnotonly muchmore
thantheBank'sestimates,butalsomore
than the cost of creating job in the
services (S)sector,andevenapproaches
the cost of employment creation in
manufacturing industry (US! 10000-
20000 per job). Most expensive of
course are the jobs created in Nudeus
Estate settlements that now suffer from
decliningreturnsto capital. Considering
that these diminishing returns are
increasingly characteristic for the other
settlement types as well, it becomes
questionable whether large scale
employment creation through
transmigration projects is still a viable
option. Especially if compared with the
opportunitiesfor labourabsorptionand
economic return in other sectors than
the agricultural one.
Our next step is to assess the
economic-demographic necessity of
transmigration for inner Indonesia, i.e.
mainly Java. For this purpose we are
using projections of the labour force
and the expected employment
opportunities inCentralJava, inorderto
estimate its surplus labour under
various conditions ofeconomic growth.
The surplus labour is taken as an
indicator for the necessity and the
potentialvolume of transmigration. The
case of Central Java was selected
because it represents one of the most
densely populated and poorest
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TABLE9
PROJECTIONSOFLABOUR FORCE,EMPLOYMENTAND LABOURSURPLUS
PER ECONOMICSECTORINCENTRALJAVA, 19*0-1990
Assumed Labour
Scenario Labour force* Employment** growth rates surplus
per
---
1990
sector 1980 1990 1980 1990 Gn °y
I A 6,6733 5,766.6 6,562.4 1.38 5.11 110.9
M 2,230.0 1,687.9 2,205.9 3.07 11.77 24.1
S 4,416.7 3,114.7 4,342.7 395 9.40 74.0
Total 10,667.0 13,320.0 10,569.2 13,1110 2.40 7.74 209.0
n A 6,987.2 5,766.6 6,406.7 1.11 4.11 580.0
M 2,139-3 1,687.9 1,961.6 1.62 6.23 177.7
S 4,193-5 3-114.7 3,845.1 2.63 562 348.4
Total 10,667.0 13,320.0 10,569.2 12,2134 1.56 5.03 1,106.6
m A 6,492.4 5,766.6 6,406.7 1.11 4.11 85.7
M 2,326.2 1,687.9 295.5 3.60 13.84 30.7
S 4,501.4 3,114.7 4,441.9 4.26 10,14 596
Total 10,667.0 13,320.0 10,569.2 13,144.1 2.44 7,87 176.0
Source: A.Komalig et al. (1984), tables IV2; IV3; IV4 (adapted)
* Assumptions for labour force projections:
-
Projectionsoftotal labourforce arebasedondecliningmortalityrates,constant
net-migration losses and in- creasing labour force participation ratio's among
females and the youngest age groups.
- The sectoral districution of the 1990-labour force follows the distribution of
the projectedemployment-structure in 1990.
** Assumptions for employment projections:
-
All sectoral projections are based on constant labour absorption coefficients
(g=Gn/Gy=constant).
-
Scenario I
• Scenario II
-
Scenario III
projections assume that Gn 1980-1990=Gn 1975-1980.
projections assume a decline of Gn 1980-1990 following a
decline of Gy in sector A=20%, sector M=40% and sector
S=40%.
assumes a constant rate of employment of 0.013 for the total
labour force andadecliningabsorptionoflabour inagriculture.
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provincesofInnerIndonesiawithavery
weak resource base.
The labour force projections are
basedonmoderatelydecliningmortality
rates, slightly increasing labour force
participation rates (especially among
females) and a constant negative
migration balance (1975-1980). Despite
a net-migration loss of 1.3 percent per
year the labour force is growing with
2.32 percent per year. All three
scenarios are based on the rather
unfavourable assumption of constant
low levels of labour absorption (g) and
relatively low levels of employment
growth (Gn). In each economic sector
the coefficient of the labour force
absorption (g) inCentralJava (A=0.27;
M=0.26; S=0.42) remains considerably
below the Indonesian average deemed
necessary for absorbingnewentrants to
the labourmarket (g 0.5)(cf.Hugoet al.,
1987, p.293).
Still,neitherofthese scenarios • even
not the most pessimistic one (II)
warrants aMalthusiansolutionbasedon
the removal of as many households as
possible through transmigration The
reasonfor this beingthat transmigration
explains only some 40 percent of the
net-migration loss from Central Java,
which mostly is absorbedby urbanjobs
in Java and the Outer Islands, thus
refrecting the migrants preference for
urban destinations. In terms of
transmigration targets and assuming an
average of 2.0 productive persons per
family, this implies the removal of the
following numbers of households:
Scenario I; 0.4 (209,000/2.0)= 41,800
households or 4,180 peyear
Scenario II; 0.4 (1,106,600/2.0)=
221,320 households or 22,132 per year
Scenario III;0.4 (176,000/2.0) = 32,000
households or 3,200 peryear
In comparison with the average of
30,000 families transmigrated from
Central Java during the period
1981-1985, the targets represent only a
modest effort and certainly do not
warrant aninflationonthe target figures
to some 50,000 families per year as
originally envisaged for Repelita IV.
One shouldkeep inmindmoreover,
that these projections are based on
rather conservative economic growth
consumptions, whereas in reality there
is still scope for increasing investments
and improving the low level of labour
absorption in the non-agricultural
sectors. As economic conditions have
been improving already during the
secondhalfofthe 1980s,there seemsno
reason at least to accept the most
pessimistic scenario II.
C. Conclusions
Although there is much reason for
concern about the way in which
transmigration is still seen as a solution
for avarietyofproblems,aswellasabout
its proper implementation, there is no
reason for discarding the idea of
transmigration as just another national
myth. The following suggestions for
reorienting and improving the
programme will make this clear:
1. The government might make a more
relaxed stand towards population
and employment problems inJava as
far as the necessity of moving large
numbersofpeople to other regions is
concerned (cf. section 2). This
enables a more realistiuc and mature
planning of the transmigration
programme, that should be geared
first of all towards the development
potentials and needs of the
underutilized regions outside Java,
thus invitingaspontaneous streamof
migrantsfromJavafar cheaperandfar
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more effective than the present
government-sponsored stream of
transmigrant-farmers (cf.Arndt, 1983;
Tjondronegoro, 1985).
2. Transmigration remains a viable
solution for people living in socalled
critical areas inJava, who have to be
evacuated because of excessive
erosion, frought, natural
catastrophies, etc. or for areas that
have to be evacuated for artificial
lakes, riads, canals, reforestation
projects, etc. Because of the limited
reserves of land suitable for
agricultural settlement in the Outer
Islands, the government should
confine her active transmigration
programmeonly to these criticalareas
(which already contain several
millions of people). This implies a
carefulselectionofthese criticalareas
and the potential transmigrants, and
not some general target imposed on
all districts or kabupaten alike.
Moreover cooperation of the
population affected should be
ensured by fair compensation
procedures for the material by the
evacuation of the Kedung Ombo
project area in CentralJava serves as
a warning example against a careless
handlingof such local interests.
3. In the Outer Islands, transmigration
should only be presented as one of
the possibilities for regional
development, although it might be a
very importantone as itmayreinforce
theagrarianproductionstructureand
increase population density in areas
previously empty (thus offering
possibiluties for increasiung food
production, marketing and transport
facilities, labour supply, etc.). Inthat
case however, again the potentials of
theregionshouldbethestandardand
not some abstract target figure
determined from behind the
planners's desk with some other
(hidden) motivations. Regional
development, however, might also
startonamorecapitalandtechnology
intensive base (providedthat bothits
economic and environmantal
limitations are taken intoaccount) by
improving the infrastructure (roads,
ports), exploiting local resources
(timber, oil, coal, ores, agricultural
export products), developing local
processing industries and improving
local services (administrative, health,
education, and finance). Indirectly
this might attract a much larger and
more qualified stream of migrants
from Java than the present
transmigration schemes (cf. Arndt,
1983).
4. Insteadof the increasingly expensive,
government sponsored
transmigration of unskilled,
impoverishedfarmers, moreattention
should be paid to the attraction of
spontaneous migrants with some
qualifications or skills (so called TSI
migrants). This is possible, exactly
because spontaneous migration to
other islands (incl. transmigration)
has already become an integrally
accepted pattern in Indonesian
society (cf. Heeren, 1967; Mochtar
Nairn, 1979; Mubyarto, 1985).
Spontaneous migrants are on the
average notonlymoresuccessful, but
also morepositively selectedthanthe
sponsored migrants (thus
contributing to a more balanced
exchange of labour betweenJava and
the Outer Islands). These better
trained migrants are a first
requirement for the development of
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the Outer Islands regions, according
to the modelproposedunderpoint3
5. The government should pay more
careful attention to die position and
role of the local (autochthonous)
population in the receiving areas.
Until recently these interests usually
have been sub-ordinated to those of
the transmigration scheme, even in
the APPDT programme. If direct
participation of the local population
inthe scheme isnotpossiblebecause
of great cultural and economic
differences (like in Irian Jaya and
Kalimantan) a parallel development
effort probably needs pretection of
the local population and taking over
of the local economy by stronger and
betterequippedgroups.A specialrole
in this parallel development effort
might be conferred upon NGO's,
which usually have a better
knowledge of the local social and
cultural conditions and economic
potentials. Once parallel
development has gained momentum,
the local population might try to
participate in more complicate
activities and institutions outside
their protected habitat or region.
Moreover, a process of regional
development as envisaged under
point 3, might entail the participation
of various ethnic groups (suku
bangsa) on a more equal base, as all
of them have to accomodate and
integralonhigher social, politicaland
economic levels, which at the same
time erode their socio-cultural
differences and prevent issues of
cultural domination. An interesting
example of such a process of
accomodationalreadyhasbeensetby
the Dayak in East Malaysia, where
several tribal communities have been
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able to adapt successfully to the new
opportunities offered by the (til and
timber boom and by subsequent
urbanization.
1 During the 5-year period preceding
the 1980-census the estimated
net-migration loss amounted to
136,000 persons per year, whereas
transmigration averaged some
50-60,000 per year.
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